Prospect balancing theory: Bounded rationality of drivers' speed choice.
This paper introduces a new approach to model the psychological determinants of drivers' speed choice: prospect-balancing theory. The theory transfers psychological insight into the bounded rationality of human decision-making to the field of driving behaviour. Speed choice is conceptualized as a trade-off between two options for action: the option to drive slower and the option to drive faster. Each option is weighted according to a subjective value and a subjectively weighted probability attributed to the achievement of the associated action goal; e.g. to avoid an accident by driving more slowly. The theory proposes that the subjective values and weightings of probability differ systematically from the objective conditions and thereby usually favour a cautious speed choice. A driving simulation study with 24 male participants supports this assumption. In a conflict between a monetary gain in case of fast arrival and a monetary loss in case of a collision with a deer, participants chose a velocity lower than that which would maximize their pay-out. Participants' subjective certainty of arriving in time and of avoiding a deer collision assessed at different driving speeds diverged from the respective objective probabilities in accordance with the observed bias in choice of speed. Results suggest that the bounded rationality of drivers' speed choice might be used to support attempts to improve road safety. Thus, understanding the motivational and perceptual determinants of this intuitive mode of decision-making might be a worthwhile focus of future research.